The Wagner Group has emerged as a potent tool in Russia’s foreign policy arsenal in Africa, embodying a blend of military privatization and geopolitical manoeuvring. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, two fragile states where Wagner’s operations illustrate how private security entities reinforce authoritarian governance, capitalize on existing power structures, and undermine Western influence. While private military entities have existed for centuries, the Wagner Group represents a unique model of contemporary statecraft. Its activities blur the boundaries between state-sponsored and private operations, granting plausible deniability to its patron state while ensuring financial and strategic benefits. In embedding itself in the security apparatuses of CAR and Mali, Wagner has achieved more than short-term military objectives—it has restructured political landscapes, capitalized on resource wealth, and propagated anti-colonial rhetoric to entrench its presence. I argue that the Wagner Group exemplifies how private military companies are weaponized by states, like Russia, to reinforce and reshape authoritarian governance, leveraging military intervention, economic exploitation, and ideological manipulation to deepen influence and control in fragile states like the Central African Republic and Mali.
Wagner in the Central African Republic: Securing Influence Through Military and Economic Dominance
The Central African Republic has been a focal point of Wagner’s operations since its initial deployment in 2018. Allegedly invited by President Faustin-Archange Touadéra in a diplomatic trip to Sochi in 2017 to stabilize internal conflict, Wagner quickly positioned itself as an indispensable actor in CAR’s security apparatus. It provided arms, training, and on-the-ground military support to government forces, most notably during the 2020 electoral crisis, when Wagner operatives helped repel rebel offensives attempting to unseat Touadéra.
This military support came with strings attached. In exchange, Wagner secured access to CAR’s abundant natural resources, including lucrative gold and diamond concessions. Through its affiliated companies, such as Lobaye Invest, the group has monopolized resource extraction, ensuring that profits flow directly to Wagner’s operators and their Kremlin backers. This arrangement reflects a broader strategy: using economic exploitation to sustain Wagner’s operations while ensuring that the financial benefits of regime protection are tied to Russian interests.
The Wagner Group’s campaign of violence in the Central African Republic (CAR) highlights how authoritarian values are reinforced through terror and coercion, consolidating power for its beneficiaries and deepening existing autocratic tendencies – hallmarks of autocracy promotion. Wagner’s partnership with the CAR regime has not only entrenched political instability but also amplified human rights violations, drawing sharp condemnation from international bodies. In March 2021, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights released a report accusing Wagner contractors, alongside CAR armed forces and MINUSCA peacekeepers, of mass executions, arbitrary detentions, torture, and forced disappearances, among other atrocities. Despite these findings, the CAR government downplayed the accusations, with spokesperson Ange Maxime Kazagui framing them as mere denunciations, even as Wagner’s influence and impunity continued to grow unchecked.
A particularly heinous aspect of Wagner’s presence in CAR has been its use of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) as a weapon of control and terror, operating with apparent state sanction. Victims have reported sexual violence that appears to be systematic—a deliberate tactic used by Wagner operatives to spread terror and assert control. Reports include incidents of young girls being lured into traps and women in maternity wards being assaulted. This normalization of SGBV as a weapon reflects the broader authoritarian dynamic that Wagner has helped foster in CAR, blurring the lines between state-sanctioned violence and the group’s unchecked impunity. By aligning itself with a regime complicit in such crimes, Wagner has not only assisted in exporting features of authoritarianism but entrenched a cycle of fear and violence that further consolidates its grip over the state.
Beyond the battlefield, Wagner has entrenched itself in CAR’s political and social fabric. Through disinformation campaigns orchestrated by its media arms, such as the fake news outlet Afrique Média, Wagner has shaped public opinion to favour Russian support while vilifying Western actors, particularly France. The group’s narrative framing casts Russia as a reliable partner for African sovereignty and development, contrasting this with a portrayal of France as a neo-colonial oppressor. This rhetoric has not only enhanced Wagner’s image but also reinforced Touadéra’s reliance on the group, consolidating Russian influence over CAR’s political future.
Mali: A Strategic Shift from France to Russia
Mali represents a more recent and equally significant theatre of Wagner’s operations. In 2021, amid growing discontent with French military interventions under Operation Barkhane, Mali’s transitional government sought an alternative partner to address a spiralling security crisis. Enter Wagner, whose deployment was framed as a repudiation of Mali’s colonial past and a pivot toward new alliances that prioritize African sovereignty. Wagner’s arrival coincided with Mali’s estrangement from its traditional Western allies, including the suspension of military cooperation with France and the expulsion of French diplomats. The group quickly positioned itself as a solution to Mali’s multifaceted challenges, offering counterterrorism expertise and security services to protect key government officials.
Yet, as in CAR, Wagner’s engagement in Mali has transcended the military sphere. Mali’s partnership with Wagner has come at a high cost. Reports indicate that the group has demanded significant payments for its services, often in the form of natural resource concessions. For instance, Mali’s vast reserves of gold have become a key area of interest, with Wagner-affiliated companies allegedly securing extraction rights under opaque agreements. This mirrors the CAR model, where economic exploitation serves both to fund Wagner’s operations and to create a self-sustaining presence in the region.
In Mali, the Wagner Group leveraged its influence through propaganda and disinformation campaigns to support the military junta’s consolidation of power while undermining democratic processes. Social media campaigns, orchestrated by Wagner-linked networks, fuelled protests against elections initially planned for February 2022, enabling Colonel Assimi Goïta’s junta to justify postponing elections until 2026. This marked a significant retreat from Mali’s promised democratic transition, triggering widespread condemnation from the international community. ECOWAS, the EU, and the United States demanded a return to constitutional rule, with ECOWAS imposing financial sanctions and activating a standby military force. Despite these pressures, Russia and China blocked a UN Security Council proposal supporting ECOWAS’s actions. Russia’s UN ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia, dismissed concerns about Wagner’s role, framing the group as a counter to perceived Western dominance in the private military sector. Pro-Russia protests staged by groups like Front du Refus aux Elections Imposées celebrated the junta’s prolonged rule, bolstered by extensive online coverage and support from Wagner’s disinformation networks.
Wagner’s intervention has significantly shaped Mali’s governance, reinforcing authoritarianism under the guise of liberation. By aligning with a regime that suppresses democratic freedoms and stifles dissent, Wagner has entrenched a governance model rooted in repression and dependency. While its anti-colonial rhetoric resonates with parts of the population, this narrative serves as a smokescreen for its deeper agenda: perpetuating the same dynamics of exploitation and control it professes to dismantle.
The Role of Anti-Colonial Narratives
Central to Wagner’s strategy in both CAR and Mali is its adept manipulation of anti-colonial and pan-African rhetoric. By presenting itself as a partner in the struggle against Western imperialism, Wagner has tapped into longstanding grievances against colonial powers, particularly France. This narrative framing has enabled the group to position its presence as a symbol of African sovereignty and resistance, even as it perpetuates new forms of exploitation.
In CAR, the Wagner Group employed this rhetoric to bolster its support among the local population, portraying Russian aid as a selfless effort to empower African states. Similarly, in Mali, anti-French sentiment was weaponized to justify the expulsion of Western actors and the adoption of Russian security partnerships. Yet, these narratives obscure the underlying dynamics of Wagner’s involvement: its interventions often exacerbate dependency, funnelling wealth, and power away from local communities and into the hands of foreign actors.
The use of anti-colonial discourse also served a broader political purpose. Framing its actions as a response to Western exploitation allowed the Wagner Group to undermine the legitimacy of Western interventions whilst advancing Russia as a champion of multipolarity. This approach resonates not only with the governments of CAR and Mali but also with broader audiences across Africa, where dissatisfaction with Western powers has created fertile ground for alternative partnerships.
Implications for Governance and Security
Wagner’s activities in CAR and Mali have profound implications for governance and security in both states. While the group’s interventions have provided short-term stability in some cases, they have also entrenched authoritarian practices, weakened state institutions, and perpetuated cycles of violence and exploitation.
In CAR, Wagner’s dominance over the security sector has effectively sidelined other actors, including UN peacekeeping missions and regional initiatives. This monopolization of power has undermined efforts to achieve a sustainable peace, as the group’s interests are often aligned with maintaining instability to justify its continued presence. Similarly, in Mali, Wagner’s counterterrorism operations have yielded mixed results, with accusations of human rights abuses and indiscriminate violence tarnishing its reputation.
The reliance on Wagner has created new forms of dependency, as governments in CAR and Mali have become increasingly reliant on Russian support to maintain their hold on power. This dynamic undermines local governance capacities and erodes the sovereignty that Putin-regime claims to champion defense of.
Conclusion: Exporting Authoritarianism Through Security and Rhetoric
The Wagner Group’s operations in CAR and Mali demonstrate how private security entities can reinforce authoritarian regimes, manipulate political landscapes, and secure foreign influence under the guise of security provision and sovereignty. Through a combination of military intervention, economic exploitation, and ideological manipulation, the Wagner Group has become a key component of Russia’s strategy to expand its global influence and challenge Western dominance.
Yet, Wagner’s approach raises critical questions about the long-term consequences of such interventions. While the group’s actions have provided short-term benefits for its clients, they have also entrenched cycles of violence, weakened state institutions, and perpetuated new forms of exploitation under the guise of anti-colonial solidarity. As CAR and Mali grapple with the legacies of Wagner’s involvement, the Wagner Group project across the Sahel provides an effective blueprint for Russia and other regimes for how private military security countries can exploit, destabilise, and intervene in the domestic politics of vulnerable states. Far from fostering stability, its interventions deepen insecurity, erode governance, and perpetuate new forms of exploitation. The Wagner blueprint offers a stark warning: the weaponization of private military companies can deepen authoritarian rule while masking the dynamics of neo-colonial control.
The views and opinions presented in this article belong solely to the author and do not necessarily represent the stance of the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA), or La Trobe University.
