Private military and security services are widely used in immigration and border management by states and organisations such as the EU. The phenomenon has grown over the last decade and fosters a number of concerns raised by academics, practitioners and NGOs. The privatisation of security services can contribute to deregulation and may have a devastating impact on the rights of all migrants, as well as on democracy.
Introduction
The use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) by states for various activities is not a new phenomenon and has been extensively studied by scholars and practitioners. However, some policy areas are more sensitive than others. In this blog, I argue that the management of migration flows is a paradigmatic example of the risks associated with the outsourcing of public tasks – especially security and military services – to private actors that are apparently regulated differently or not at all.
Although this has been discussed as a consequence of the changing nature of security, the phenomenon should be strictly regulated, not only at a general level but also in specific policies. As it has been observed in a ICOCA policy brief, where private companies are contracted, states should also ensure that human rights are not violated. This requires substantial investment, which not all states are prepared to make. The EU in particular, which claims to be based on solidarity and the protection of human rights, should be extremely cautious.
Who are PMSCs and why are they involved in migration flows
PMSCs are private companies that provide security services to different clients under different conditions. They also provide military services, ranging from combat operations and security patrols to logistical support and training.
They can be hired by governments, multinational corporations, NGOs and anyone who needs specialised military or security expertise, especially when deployed in conflict zones. One of the main advantages of employing such actors is their flexibility and readiness to perform. They can be recruited and deployed quickly, and their loyalty is usually to the entity paying them rather than to any cause. The above-mentioned ICOCA policy brief cites a number of examples of abuses committed by PMSC personnel in camps and refugee centres, both in the United States and in Europe.
PMSCs are increasingly hired by states to manage migration flows, offering a range of services presented as mechanisms for simple technological solutions to immigration control. They maneuver in immigration detention centres and border control operations, providing technical and policy expertise, surveillance technology and data exploitation solutions and services. PMSCs also provide airlines for secure transport services to move migrants between detention centres and for deportations, forced returns and so-called voluntary returns of individuals and groups. In doing so, PMSCs exert considerable influence on national, regional and international policy-making, although this is the main reason why governments look to them.
The UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries has already produced reports calling for a more cautious approach to a use that can easily turn into abuse. In a report published in 2020, the experts argue that ‘through this expertise, these companies frame the response to migration as one necessarily characterised by emergencies, crises and perceived threats, feeding and reinforcing the exclusionary, hard-line immigration narratives’ and ‘push for security and often militarised solutions’.
According to the report, in recent years, an increasing number of states have contracted national or local construction and infrastructure companies to erect physical barriers in the form of walls, fences, often topped with barbed wire, and watchtowers along their land borders. Border guards are stationed at various points along these physical structures, and in some places private security guards are also present. In addition, the guards tasked with preventing entry by land, air and sea are equipped with physical assets such as maritime patrol vessels, drones, helicopters and aircraft purchased from large defence contractors and national and sometimes transnational shipbuilders.
The market is dominated by a few large transnational companies, many of which have complex forms of ownership such as joint ventures, with frequent acquisitions and branching or subcontracting. This way of operating allows these companies to maximise profits by providing services in several markets through multiple subsidiaries.
The phenomenon appears to be most pronounced in the European Union and the United States. In particular, EU Member States have become dependent on PMSCs for various aspects of border management and have relied extensively on their expertise.
Migrants as an issue to be desecuritised
Migration is clearly a concern for many European countries. The need to ensure the security of the EU’s borders and legitimate cross-border mobility, on the one hand, and the urgency of tackling irregular migration and human trafficking, on the other, have led to different institutional experiments that have failed to strike such a balance.
The term ‘migrant’ encompasses different categories of people, such as asylum seekers, refugees and migrant workers, who are subject to different statuses and regulations. But without any specific difference, migration is listed among political, economic and social threat, often connected to terrorism, to the health emergency and to security concerns. The populist and right-wing rhetoric, which is strong in several European countries, has contributed to this perception.
Such a securitisation approach has been a constant in EU policy, and the pandemic has helped to revitalise it. Especially during this period, government policies have become more intolerant, placing migrants in an indefinite limbo, without rights, without support and without access to social services. Masses of undocumented refugees remained trapped in a hostile environment. As well as threatening the lives of people, especially those living in camps, the virus provided governments with an excuse to legitimise their policies of closing borders and creating exclusion.
The militarisation of European borders is a fairly consolidated practice. Since March 2020, several European countries have started to deploy military forces to defend their national borders. This has been done in the name of national security, to reinforce and facilitate border closures and other movement restrictions through controls and patrols. This also included the use of military equipment for migration control, particularly in the Mediterranean. To complement such measures, EU member states, following the root causes approach, have encouraged third countries to prevent migrants from reaching Europe, with bilateral agreements that inevitably risk legitimising authoritarian regimes and illiberal practices towards vulnerable people.
In line with the logic of the EU’s externalisation of borders, the delegation of authority to private actors allows states to obfuscate such responsibilities. The lack of regulation of PMSCs and the difficulty in determining the content of due diligence obligations make it difficult to identify who should be held accountable for human rights violations and how this should be done. There is also a lack of transparency in how data is collected and shared by PMSCs. Even if not directly responsible, these companies are complicit in human rights violations and abuses committed by other actors, such as immigration and border authorities, through the security technologies they provide and their co-framing of migration as a security threat for which the solution lies in the security and military technical and technological tools that only they can provide.
Therefore, it is possible to affirm that, these private non-state actors not only provide advanced border security and migration control services to Member States and their partners (non-EU countries of transit and origin), but are also heavily involved in setting priorities of the EU defence and security research agenda. There is evidence that in doing so they contribute to the framing of irregular migration as a security threat that can only be addressed through emergency military responses – and, conveniently, the same services provided by PMSCs.
Why this matters and what should be done
These developments are creating a black hole in the EU. The current lack of transparency and the weak existing regulation prevents PMSCs from being held accountable for human rights abuses, as they have a strong incentive to push for harsh immigration policies for their own profit. They also contribute to the transformation of migrants into security threats. Paradoxically, this is facilitated by the lack of public awareness of EU contracts with PMSCs.
Deep and long-standing concerns have been expressed by the United Nations and the above-mentioned Working Group, which has already stressed the need for more regular reviews of advanced purchased technologies and called for PMSCs to be regulated by an international legally binding instrument.
In the absence of stronger political controls, civil society organisations have played an important role. NGOs have continued to denounce the most brutal effects of militarisation and forced return, and to remind states of the need to protect migrants and refugees as vulnerable people. Migration is one of the most visible examples of a wider issue.
The privatisation of military functions raises concerns about accountability, transparency and respect for human rights standards. The presence of private military actors’ challenges state authority and can weaken the state’s monopoly on the use of force. This erosion of state authority can have implications for democratic governance, as traditional mechanisms of oversight and accountability may be less effective when military functions are outsourced to private entities. The fact that this is happening within the EU and between EU member states is not only a major contradiction, but also a dangerous incompatibility with democratic values and procedures. Member States will inevitably need to re-examine existing frameworks and adapt to the changing security landscape, also in the light of the new commitments made by the new EU Commission.
Restrictions on the tasks assigned to PMSC personnel, specific training to take account of the needs of different categories of migrants and refugees, and coordination in the management of centres, together with a framework to regulate the involvement of NGOs and civil society organisations (particularly at local level) are necessary steps that the EU institutions will have to reflect on.
The views and opinions presented in this article belong solely to the author and do not necessarily represent the stance of the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA). Daniela Irrera is Professor of International Relations at the School of Advanced Defence Studies in Rome, and a specialist in non-state actors and their influence on international politics. Among non-state actors, PMSCs are the most ambiguous, and their increasing use in several sensitive policy areas poses significant challenges.
ICoCA’s policy brief: Securing Dignity The Imperatives of Responsible Security in migration surveillance and detention, examines key aspects and risks which distinguish migration management by private security providers.