The involvement of organised crime in the circuit of various illicit commodities shows an active dynamic in the Andean countries (large cocaine producers), where porous borders favor their possibilities of expansion and connection of their economic logic. Analogous to formal firms, criminal organizations seek the profitability of their businesses. In the 21st century, this is manifested in a complex system that structures international trade in supply chains, which also allows a better understanding of their empirical system: fewer and fewer criminal organizations operate with extensive and expanding logistical structures, and increasingly, smaller organizations with fewer members are shown to operate locally and connected to the transnational system through specific tasks in the supply chains of illegal products (or other goods).
The aim of this article is to describe the current characteristics of the Andean criminal organizations system operating in the region. The evolution of organised crime, i.e., its widespread fragmentation, the existence of hundreds of groups in constant dispute for control of local territories, and for participation in certain activities of local illicit economies, are the main premises for describing the current system of criminal organizations that have been generating a scenario of violence and social disorder in the Andean region. The article gives some light to the threats that this criminal landscape poses to public and private security.
The following blog post is based on a policy brief written by the same author on the topic of recent transformations of criminal organizations in Latin America.
Fragmented, headless and flexible criminal structures in the global economy
Fragmentation. Globalization promoted the fragmentation of the supply chains of the world economy. If previously a corporation controlled much of the activities and tasks necessary for the manufacture and trade of its products, now multiple companies, organizations and individuals participate in different segments of the supply chains. Similarly, both the logistical patterns of criminal organizations and the system in which they operate have been modified.
Transformation in size and structure. There has been a shift from (a) having complex and extensive pyramid-like structures with a unitary command that organised and controlled all production, distribution, sales, and administration of violence in their territories, to (b) the proliferation of fragmented, flexible, disconnected cells with reduced size; which operate short segments of some activities of the supply chains of illegal economies such as cocaine, timber, gold, and other goods.
Fragmentation and system dispersion. The criminal trade system where these organizations operate was transformed and generated a delocalized operating structure of simultaneous activities and tasks. Now the several tasks along the chain are geographically dispersed, so they imply a massive participation of intermediary actors that break the logic of a unity of command concentrated in a single criminal organization.
Hierarchies. The dispersion of the flows and dynamics of the supply chains of illegal economies and the fragmentation of criminal organizations have generated a particular context in the third decade of the century. Local criminal structures were generated, with a smaller operational size, with local hierarchies, hence with the capacity to connect with each other, where there is little capacity to control all the chain(s), generating a multiplicity of flexible, adaptable, and headless operational cores in many places (several territories or countries). This has allowed small-sized executive cells with few members to participate in a decentralized and fragmented network of variable transactions in territorially delimited spaces.
Dispersed power, territorial diversification, and competition within the criminal system
Participation in illegal supply chains. There is a trend towards active participation of local criminal organizations in operations (specific activities and tasks) of the supply chains of illegal economies (gold, timber, cocaine, smuggling, among others). However, these are spatially dispersed activities and tasks, simultaneously, in a dynamic without a single pyramidal structure of operational control.
Search for territorial control. These tasks are developed in specific parcels of the territory where criminal organizations tend to seek control. This allows controlling a section of the sale and supply of the multiple chains that may be articulated and connected with other organizations and (licit or illicit) economies in a complex network that does not depend on the operations of a single territorialized unit.
Diversification of crime. The physical control of the territory is sought to simultaneously participate in different legal businesses (construction, gambling, cigarettes, retail trade, among others) and illegal ones – sexual exploitation and pimping, drug trafficking, and illegal mining.
Predatory crime. In this logic, they seek control of certain territories, and to do so, they generate mechanisms for exercising violence, such as extortion of local businesses and actors, and corruption of state officials. In contrast to urban common crime, criminal organizations resort to predatory crime not only to obtain resources but also to establish alliances with gangs or local criminals and to generate control of local activities (extortion and rent collection) which often involves the corruption of control officials.
Disputes for territorial control. Territorial control is important, as well as the division of the territory and the activities to be controlled, which tends to be associated with disputes, growth in the homicide rate in certain contexts, or the spread of manifestations of hired killing and extortion where there have been disputes for local control. This is associated with three common scenarios (although they are not the only ones):
(i) Organizations that have territorial control and have stable territorial nuclei, have more capacity to generate control of businesses, the administration of violence, and corruption to dose the intervention of the police or formal law enforcement forces.
(ii) In scenarios where there is more than one criminal organization or group in the same territory, competition tends to arise for space, control of participation in the economic chain of associated crimes, and, therefore, greater intensity of violence (associated with confrontation by competition).
(iii) When there are criminal organizations that only have control over certain areas of the territory or certain economic activities, spaces are generated for individual criminal activity by criminals and predatory crimes that do not obey a territorial control structure, generating a great intensity of violence.
Connections and competition between local organizations. The division of the territory and activities generates the need for connections between territorial parcels, which can occur in terms of collaboration with adjacent territories, in terms of competition, or in terms of franchising (coordinated opening of a cell of the organization in another territory). Thus, a network of connections of commercial interests of territorial units that trade and exchange is generated, without necessarily belonging to the same organizational fabric.
Rising Threats in a Fragmented Criminal World: Security’s New Frontier
There is no organizational center to pursue. The evolution of criminal networks has led to the emergence of fragmented structures, lacking a centralized leadership or organizational core. Unlike the large, hierarchical organizations of the past, today’s criminal groups consist of smaller, locally embedded cells. This decentralization creates significant challenges for law enforcement and criminal intelligence. Dismantling one organization no longer results in the collapse of the criminal system; instead, it merely allows other cells to step in and replace it. As a result, strategies and tools that were once effective in combating large criminal organizations in the 1990s and early 21st century have become less impactful against a system that continually regenerates and adapts.
System fragmentation generates disorder. This fragmentation has far-reaching consequences, chief among them being a sharp rise in violence. Criminal cells have proliferated, particularly in regions critical to illegal economies—like border areas, ports, and commercial hubs—sparking an alarming escalation in violent conflicts. Where once there were two or three structured organizations, now there may be ten or fifteen competing cells. These groups often engage in violent clashes as they battle for control over territory and illegal activities. This competition and fragmentation among criminal groups have fueled a rise in lethal violence, prompting states of emergency in countries like Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, and heightened security alerts in Chile and Bolivia. This type of violence is diffuse, with no single group or origin, making it difficult for law enforcement to pinpoint specific intervention targets using traditional methods designed for large, transnational organizations.
Predatory crime is on the rise. The fragmentation of criminal organizations has also led to a surge in predatory crime, particularly extortion and the collection of “protection” fees from both formal and informal businesses. Companies are increasingly facing threats such as extortion, violence against their employees, and other risks that challenge their security protocols. This rise in predatory crime affects not only businesses but also the safety of citizens, including corporate employees and private security personnel.
What is happening with private security ? In response to this evolving threat landscape, private security companies and their clients are facing unique and escalating challenges. This is evident in the growing incidence of extortion, violent robberies at banks and casinos, and lethal violence in mining operations and shopping centers. These new threats require a strong and coordinated response from both public and private security forces to safeguard citizens, businesses, and infrastructure.
To ensure the continuity of their operations, clients of private security companies—such as mining and other extractive firms—are investing heavily in training and safety procedures to protect against armed attacks and cargo theft by criminal organizations. However, these external threats demand a comprehensive security approach that extends beyond internal measures to encompass the control and mitigation of risks posed by organized crime. Private security should be viewed as an essential component of a company’s broader threat management strategy, playing a vital role in addressing threats but not serving as the ultimate solution. This approach goes beyond merely reacting to conflict—such as through the deployment of private military services—and involves proactively updating the company’s strategy to confront insidious and deadly threats. Adopting a resilient security management strategy is crucial, enabling systems to recover, adapt, and return to normalcy following any criminal incident.
What can be done ? With these growing threats from criminal organizations, it is essential to improve knowledge management regarding these groups and their operations within specific territories. Security companies must develop the tools and expertise needed to gather detailed information on the nature, timing, and location of criminal activities and to assess the scale of threats based on the patterns of illegal supply chains. The frequency and intensity of threats posed by 21st-century criminal organizations are unprecedented, necessitating an approach grounded in criminological theory and specialized methodologies. This approach will enhance the services provided by private security companies, enabling them to effectively navigate the complex and ever-changing threat landscape.