I. Introduction.
Upon arriving in Central America’s largest capital, Guatemala City, one of the first things that stands out isn’t just the standstill traffic—it’s the sight of a private security guard stationed outside nearly every business. In almost all cases, they are armed, usually with a shotgun, a stark reminder of the security challenges the country continues to face today.
Today, around 271 private security companies (PSCs) are registered in Guatemala, a number which has grown by 188% in the last 14 years (DIGESSP). Guards protect businesses, government institutions, infrastructure projects and gated communities where wealthy Guatemalans reside. Although the country’s homicide rate (15.6 cases per 100,000) has decreased in recent years, Guatemala City remains one of the most dangerous cities in the world with a homicide rate of 48.7 per 100,000.
The prevalence of firearms in Guatemala, which are legally and readily available, significantly exacerbates this crisis. There are more than 500,000 firearms registered with the General Directorate of Arms and Municipalities (DIGECAM), a unit attached to the Ministry of Defence, but according to analysis by security experts, the number of unregistered – or illegal – firearms could be four times higher. Throughout 2023, at least 8 in 10 homicides were committed with a firearm.
In this context, PSCs may seem like a necessity, especially given the presence of several well-organised criminal groups which operate in the country (including the region’s most notorious maras, Bario-18 and MS-13).
However, like in other Latin American countries, the private security sector is poorly regulated, poorly trained and susceptible to corruption. It is also a significant source of diversion of weapons which fuel crime in Guatemala and more globally, the region. PSCs possess around 15% of all weapons in Guatemala, but are responsible for almost 35% of weapons reported as “lost” or “stolen”, which begs the question: how do Guatemalan PSCs contribute to the proliferation of firearms diversion?
II. A brief history of Guatemala: guns and the privatisation of security.
To effectively address this question, it is essential to understand the recent history of violence in Guatemala, and the 36-year-long Guatemalan civil war, whose legacy of 250,000 deaths continues to affect the country today.
Guatemala’s civil war
The civil war, characterised by a struggle between Marxist guerrillas and successive authoritarian governments dominated by the military, severely weakened the country’s institutions. It eroded key principles, such as civilian control over the military and the subordination of armed forces to elected leadership. Politics during this period were marked by a series of coups, behind-the-scenes deals, and a revolving door of alliances among economic elites and top military intelligence figures.
Following the 1996 peace accords, reforms reduced the size of the Guatemalan military by two-thirds and the sudden influx of unemployed, disillusioned soldiers led to a rapid expansion of the private security sector. Former military personnel sought new business opportunities, particularly in private security, and became involved in the growing illicit networks in the region. As former Guatemalan Foreign Minister Edgar Gutiérrez put it “these groups began to operate under the legal backing of a company or corporation, to provide security services to the public, but also to carry out informal work, including kidnapping and intimidation”.
III. The proliferation of private security companies.
The conflict left behind a legacy of weak institutions, including a police force plagued by corruption and inefficiency. Faced with an overwhelmed and under-resourced public security apparatus and a skyrocketing homicide rate, Guatemalans, particularly those with financial resources, increasingly turned to private security for protection. Gated communities, patrolled by armed guards, became a common sight. Wealthy individuals began hiring bodyguards, and businesses invested heavily in private security measures. The imbalance between the number of private security guards and the number of police officers in Guatemala highlights the state’s retreat from its core responsibility of ensuring public safety.
According to the Division of Private Security Companies (DIGESSP), which is responsible for regulating, licensing and overseeing the provision of private security services in Guatemala, in 40 years, from 1970 to 2010, 140 new PSCs were registered in the country. In the last 14 years, the number of registered private security companies has increased by 188%. As of December 2024, there are 271 PSCs registered in Guatemala and more than 22,000 people are licensed as private security guards.
However, there exists a considerable clandestine market in the Guatemalan security sector. According to the 2018 Census, a total of 56,185 individuals worked in security activities, which means that only approximately 40% of those engaged in these security tasks have been properly registered. In 2014, the Guatemalan government admitted that 99% of the country’s registered private security guards were “working illegally”, meaning they had not completed the training and certification required under the terms of a 2010 law regulating private security services. There are also several cases of PSCs operating with expired licenses.
It is estimated that the number of private security guards surpasses the combined numbers of active military personnel and police forces in the country. Some estimates place the number of private security guards in Guatemala at between 130,000 and 150,000. In contrast, Guatemala has 21,500 active military personnel and 42,000 police officers.
IV. The military and Guatemala’s private security sector are deeply interconnected.
Most PSCs are owned by former military personnel, and many of the country’s private security contractors are military veterans. As Sandino Asturias, general coordinator of the Centro de Estudios de Guatemala, notes: “It is said that private security companies were the first post-war businesses for the reconverted military. Some even describe it as military reconversion… creating a new way for the military to connect with economic power through private security firms”.
A 2008 study by the Organization of American States (OAS) found that in Guatemala, “75% of private security companies are directed or managed by ex-military personnel, while the remaining 25% are run by ex-policemen.” A decade later, in 2019, the Guatemalan investigative outlet Plaza Pública analysed the country’s 22 most prominent security firms and discovered that 15 of them were managed or directed by former military personnel.
According to José Alfredo Calderón, a former member of Guatemala’s postwar Disarmament Commission, and one of the drafters of the country’s Weapons and Ammunition Law as well as the 2010 law regulating private security companies, “[t]he ownership of the entire security sector—encompassing arms and ammunition, shooting ranges, armories, arms sales, and private security companies—rests in the hands of the military. That was one of the main findings of all the studies and analyses”.
V. How do PSCs contribute to the illicit proliferation of weapons?
Overall, registered PSCs represent a significant proportion (approximately 14.7% or 103,811 firearms) of all gun licenses issues in the country.
However, PSCs account for a disproportionate number (35.2%) of firearms which have been reported as stolen or lost. Of the 57,839 registered firearms which were reported as stolen or lost – 31,267 were owned by individuals and 21,014 by private security companies. In several cases, these “stolen” or “lost” weapons were only reported as such after they were seized by the Guatemalan National Police (PNC).
These figures suggest that the private security sector is disproportionately overrepresented in the phenomenon of weapons diversion. The data is also supported by several high-profile cases, where large numbers of weapons intended for organised criminal groups were seized from Guatemalan PSCs. Although the Guatemalan government releases little information on the topic, in August 2018, the Unit Against Firearms Trafficking of the Public Ministry revealed that they were investigating ten PSCs on suspicion of arms trafficking. Among the companies investigated was one that “suddenly” checked its warehouses and detected “that 240 weapons had been lost”. One of these “lost” weapons was a .38 Smith & Wesson which was found in the possession of an extortionist; he was subsequently sentenced to prison for illegal possession of a firearm, amongst other crimes.
In another high-profile case, weapons and ammunition were found in a vehicle belonging to a PSC intended for members of Barrio 18. The three private guards arrested were members of Barrio 18, and according to investigators, they collaborated with organised crime by facilitating weapons transfers.
In addition, there is a substantial lack of enforcement of firearms training requirements for PSCs in Guatemala. Any Guatemalan citizen requesting an authorisation to carry firearms from DIGECAM (including PSC employees) must undergo an evaluation on the following: basic aspects of the firearms and ammunition law; security measures with firearms; technical aspects of firearms operation; use of firearms; and a psychological evaluation. In theory, all private security guards should also pass these evaluations to be able to carry firearms, but the overwhelming majority do not undergo them. Furthermore, between 2016 and 2021, more than 50% of guards who were evaluated failed the test.
Numerous cases of PSC executives actively participating in firearms diversion have been reported in the Guatemalan press, including the following incidents:
- 2016 – Private Security Guards Supplying Weapons to Gang Members
- In Villa Nueva, the PNC intercepted a vehicle belonging to a PSC and discovered a cache of weapons. The weapons were intended for Barrio 18 gang members.
- 2017 – Arrest of Owners of Unregistered PSCs
- A father and son operating two unregistered PSCs were arrested. 35 weapons were seized during the operation.
- 2019 – Seizure of Over 400 Weapons from an Unregistered PSC
- The PNC seized 410 firearms, two sound grenades, and a stolen vehicle from an unregistered PSC allegedly involved in arms trafficking. Two people were arrested for illegal provision of security services and unlawful possession of firearms.
- 2019 – Dismantling of a Gang Linked to PSC Arms Trafficking
- Police deployed 3,000 agents in an operation that dismantled a gang acquiring firearms irregularly through a PSC. Authorities captured 11 individuals and confiscated nearly 1,000 weapons.
- 2020 – Dismantling of an Illegal Security Company
- Authorities dismantled the unlicensed PSC, which had registered approximately 900 firearms with falsified documents. Eight individuals were arrested, and 138 firearms were seized.
A private security guard following firearms safety best practice outside a bank in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala (author’s photograph)
VI. How does a PSC lose its guns?
PSCs can contribute to the diversion of weapons in Guatemala through various means.
Firstly, a significant contributing factor of diversion is that the management of arsenals in these companies is inadequate, presenting significant vulnerabilities that fuel the country’s illegal arms market. This is not unique to Guatemala: one study determined that as much as 40 percent of the illegal firearms in circulation in El Salvador are linked to the country’s estimated 500 private security companies. In Honduras, the general lack of regulation of private security companies feeds the illegal trade of firearms. In Brazil, more than 17,600 weapons were “stolen” from private security companies in Rio de Janeiro state alone, representing nearly 30 percent of PSC stockpiles.
Guatemala’s poor record in PSC arsenal management is tied to a lack of adequate regulation of the private security sector, and to the limited means available to government agencies. DIGESSP does not include any regional branches outside of Guatemala City, severely limiting its ability to regulate PSCs in areas of the country affected by conflict over extractive activities, such as the mountainous highlands of Huehuetenango, where weapons trafficking is also fuelled by the demand coming from southern Mexico, where cartels are engulfed in conflict for control of the border, and are often allied with local Guatemalan criminal groups.
Secondly, another form of diversion is linked to the poor working conditions of security guards in Guatemala, whose precarious status is exacerbated by a loophole in the relevant legislation. While regulations mandate a relatively costly certification process for security guards, they do not require companies to cover the cost of this training. The law only requires companies to issue their employees a credential signed and stamped by DIGESSP and the company’s owner or legal representative. To the knowledge of the authors, no PSC in Guatemala has ever faced charges for employing uncertified guards. This lack of enforcement leaves uncertified private security contractors particularly vulnerable to unjust termination or retaliation if they voice concerns about working conditions.
Guatemalan security guards typically endure long hours and dangerous work for minimal pay. Data from thousands of bids and contracts indicate that 12-hour shifts are the norm, with guards frequently earning less than minimum wage. These conditions enable substantial profit margins for PSCs. According to Carmen Rosa De León, director of the Instituto de Enseñanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible (IEPADES), guards receive about half—or sometimes less—of the amount charged to clients.
In unaccredited PSCs, conditions are even worse. Employees are often denied vacations, sick leave, or social security benefits. These difficult working conditions create strong incentives for guards to collaborate with gangs or narcotraffickers, particularly in the diversion of arms. Indeed, selling a diverted firearm can provide a security guard with the equivalent of several months’ pay. Guards who leave their jobs without proper compensation—a common occurrence—often retain their weapons as a form of payment, which they frequently resell on the black market.
Thirdly and most seriously, senior figures in a PSC may be directly involved in the diversion of firearms, in which case the entire structure of the organisation becomes a conduit for arms trafficking at a large scale. In these cases, PSC managers can have links to organised crime or simply engage in corrupt and criminal behaviour if the opportunity presents itself. From an arms control standpoint, particularly risky junctures appear at the end of the lifespan of a PSC, when it may be dissolved or split into two between associates, with one of them keeping the arsenal and the other reporting the guns “stolen or lost” and acquiring new ones.
The challenges surrounding the diversion of weapons by PSCs in Guatemala highlight a critical gap in the regulation and enforcement of arms control measures. In this context, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) establishes clear principles regarding the training, management, and storage of weapons and ammunition, which, if properly implemented, could mitigate these risks. This includes ensuring that all personnel authorised to carry weapons are properly trained in their safe and responsible use, having strict policies and procedures for the authorisation, use, and management of weapons and ammunition, and implementing secure storage measures for weapons and ammunition to prevent unauthorized access and theft.
VII. Conclusion
To conclude, the lack of adequate supervision of PSCs in Guatemala presents significant risks, compounded by fragile state institutions that are unable to effectively regulate these companies. Guatemala is entangled in a complex web of violence, fuelled by the easy availability of firearms and a poorly regulated private security sector. A recent surge in firearm purchases has coincided with rising homicide rates, with many cases linked to stolen or diverted weapons from PSCs. These companies often operate without proper oversight, training, or effective arsenal management, creating vulnerabilities that feed the illegal arms market.
The role of PSCs in Guatemala, presents a stark case of a growing disconnect between the state’s responsibility for security and its ability to deliver it, creating a two-tiered system of safety where privilege dictates protection. While private security offers a perception of increased safety for paying clients, it creates a spatial and psychological separation between those who can afford it and the surrounding environment experiencing higher crime rates. This stratified approach to security essentially commodifies safety, making it accessible only to those with sufficient financial resources. More importantly, as highlighted above, the rapid and unregulated growth of the private security sector also contributes to the deterioration of the security situation, fuelling arms trafficking and diversion. In this way, Guatemalan PSCs help exacerbate the very problem they were created to address.
Adopting established international standards can significantly elevate the professionalism and effectiveness of Guatemala’s private security sector. These standards offer a comprehensive framework for responsible private security operations across various critical domains.
- The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) underscore the importance of conducting thorough human rights due diligence, employing force only when strictly necessary and proportionate, and providing effective grievance mechanisms.
- The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers Association (ICoCA) outlines voluntary principles promoting responsible security practices, covering areas such as the use of force, firearms management, fair working conditions, and human rights. Currently, only one company operating in Guatemala is a member of ICoCA.
- ISO Standards, including PSC.1 and ISO 18788, provide guidance for establishing, implementing, and improving management systems within private security companies. These standards emphasise best practices for risk assessment, service delivery, personnel training, and ongoing improvement processes.
Achieving this requires a multi-pronged approach involving potentially stricter regulations, improved enforcement by a strengthened DIGESSP, adequate training of private security professionals in compliance with international standards, and a focus on dismantling the security black market; all crucial steps towards curbing violence and fostering a safer Guatemala.
Funding and the political will to advocate for and implement international standards in Guatemala’s private security sector remain significant challenges. Addressing this gap requires a coordinated effort involving multiple stakeholders. International organizations, such as the UN or the OAS, could play a critical role in providing technical and financial assistance to foster compliance with global security norms. Similarly, foreign governments with vested interests in regional stability could fund initiatives as part of broader security assistance programs. At the national level, the Guatemalan government must prioritise allocating funds to strengthen DIGESSP’s regulatory capacity.
Ultimately however, the answer to Guatemala’s security woes does not lie in the privatisation of security. The long-term solution requires a robust public security system built on trust, professionalism, and effective law enforcement. This necessitates tackling corruption within the police force and investing in social programs that address the root causes of crime, such as poverty and inequality.
The views and opinions presented in this article belong solely to the author and do not necessarily represent the stance of the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA).
